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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT 
vs. 
VERA MASON 
DEFENDANT AND APELLANT 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT 
UPON PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is a petition for rehearing 
of case no. 13642 made pursuant to Rule 
76 (e) Utah Rules of Procedure alleging 
error in the prior decision. 
DISPOSITION ON PRIOR HEARING 
This Court, voting three to two 
affirmed defendant's conviction by a jury 
at the district court level. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON REHEARING 
Defendant seeks rehearing, reconsider-
Case No. 
13642 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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ation of a portion of the court's prior 
ruling, and consideration of matters not 
dealt with in the Court's majority opinion 
although raised by Defendant's earlier brief, 
and reversal of judgment and vacation of 
sentence pursuant thereto. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
So far as material to this rehearing 
the facts are as follows: 
Defendant, at her trial for theft, 
was questioned about use of narcotics on hte 
morning of trial and answered in the affirmati 
the questions and answers being allowed over 
Defense Counsel's objections. 
Later, David 17. King, a police officei 
was recalled to the stand to testify for the 
State. He gave an account of his experience 
in narcotics work, and his training in that ax 
(R114); gave his opinion as to what the effect 
of two balloons of heroin (the quantity Defen-
dant had earlier admitted to using) would 
have on a "normal" person if the narcotic had Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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now being a quarter to four?" (Hospitalization 
(R. 115); gave his opinion as to the state of 
an "addict" under the same time interval 
(wanting some more; but neither extrenaly high 
nor in painful withdrawal) (R. 116). Under 
cross-examination by Defense Counsel Officer 
King testified about "cutting" of heroin and 
strengths (R. 117); kinds of heroin (Mexico 
brown and French white) (R. 118); the kind and 
typical strength of heroin available in Salt 
Lake City (Mexico brown, "...typically 3 to 7 
per cent") (R. 118), and gave an opinion that 
an "addict"having taken a two bolloon dose at 
8:30 A.M. would not by the time of day he was 
testifying be "off in another world" (R. 119). 
Deferidant's objections were overruled 
by the Court three times, (R. 110, 111) asto 
admissions being elicited from the defendant/ 
witness. The testimony of the officer as exper 
was objected to for lack of relevance (R. 114) 
for lack of foundation (R. 114, 115) and over-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ruled in each case. The State did not offer 
and the record does not disclose any proffer 
of testimony which would tend to show the 
truth of defendant's admissions (as to use of, 
or being a user of drugs) by any independent 
evidence whatsoever. Nor does the record 
disclose any more that generalized statements 
by Officer King as to the effect of two balloo 
on a "normal" person or an "addict". There is 
no testimony whatever that Officer King tied 
his observations or conclusions to the 
defendant as an individual on that he made any 
observation of her or that he was able to form 
or elucidate any judgment as to her condition. 
ARCUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT, IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS NO ERROR 
IN PERMITTING POLICE OFFICER TO TESTIFY AS 
EXPERT TO THE EFFECTS OF NARCOTICS IN GENERAL 
TERMS ON A "NORMAL" PERSON AND ON AN "ADDICT" 
WHEN DEFENDANT WAS NOT SHOWN TO BE EITHER, Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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HENCE TO TESTIFY WITHOUT ANY PROBATIVE RE_ 
LATIONS11I.P TO THE DEFENDANT'S CONDITION ON 
THE DAY OF TRIAL, MISAPPLIED THE LAW BY 
APPLYING A CIVIL RULE TO A CRIMINAL CASE AS 
TO THE PERMISSIBLE USE OF EXPERTS: AND 
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT EXPERT TESTI-
MONY WAS ADMISSIBLE WITHOUT INDEPENDENT FOUN-
DATION OR RELATIONSHIP TO THE DEFENDANT 
THEREIN MISAPPLYING THE RULE OF LAW AS ADOPTED 
BY THE WEIGHT OF U.S. AUTHORITY. 
It is true that the trial judge has 
considerable latitude as to the necessary 
qualifications of and the need for expert 
witnesses to help the jury understand matters 
before them for decision, as both Apellant 
(Defendant) and Respondent (State) have agreed 
in thdir previous briefs. Apellant cites 
Startin v. Madsen, 120 U 631, 237 P2d 834; 
Webb v. Olin Hathieson Chemical Corp., 9 U2d 
275, 342 P2d 1094, 80 ALR2d 476. Respondent 
cites Road Commission v. Silliman, 22 u2d 33, Dig tized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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418 P2d 347 (1968); Marsh v. Irvine, 22 U2d 
154, 449 P2d 996 (1969); Stanmeyer v. Leathara 
Broas, Inc M 20 U2d 421, 439 P2d 279 (1969). 
It is, however, a misapplication of 
that generalized principle to rule that the 
trial court's indisputably considerable 
latitude of discretion is so broad that if the 
trial court finds the expert witness competent 
his testimony is admissible and no abuse of 
discretion occurs in a criminal case. 
In all the Utah cases cited above, the 
actions were civil in nature, and it connot 
be demonstrated from the cases that any sub-
stantial amount of prejudice in the fact findt 
mind would have been turned against the 
appellant party by the expert testimony. That 
that what the experts said in the above cases 
would in any way inflame the jury or judge 
against him, or cause the fact-finder to 
find against him on an extraneous ground of 
animosity or prejudice toward the apellant as Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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prejudice is narrowly understood in the law. 
All these cases turn on whether or 
not experts were needed, or if they were if 
they were competently qualified to speak to th 
jury authoritatively arid with expertise. 
None of these cases involves testimony 
of an allegedly narcotics-using witness him-
or herself on tiral in a felony case. None 
of these cases relates to narcotics-use in-
quiries in any way. Yet, narcotics use when 
admitted in evidence is beyond doubt inflammat 
to criminal juries against the user whether 
witness or defendant. Thus the rule is that 
it is only proper subject for testimony when 
the offense itself involves use, sale or 
possession or when it goes to the witness's 
credibility and ability to recall. By explorir 
the effect on the witness's mind at the time c 
the observations he is testifying to, to see 
if his perceptions of events is tinged with 
druefcv unreality. Bv inauirinp into the courtr 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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competency of the witness to testify co-
herently and without distorted recollection 
where recent use is suspected* 
The kajority opinion in the prior 
consideration of this case seems to leave the 
entire matter in the hands of the trial court 
and to rely on S illiman and Stagmeyer as 
authority for doing so, without ever addressin) 
the issue of prejudice to the defendant by 
admission of expert testimony without probativ< 
value. 
The testimony of the State1s alleged 
expert was never related to defendant in any 
meaningful way (as was pointed out in the diss< 
on the prior hearing of this case). Hence that 
testimony had no materiality and could only 
have operated to prejudice the defendant in 
the jury's eyes. 
It has been stated that such an 
introduction of prejudicial material can resul 
in infringement of the right to a fair trial. 
E.g. People v. Telio, 1 111, App 3d 526, 275 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generat d OCR, may contain errors.
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NE2d 22Xat 225 and cases there cited. 
To disregard the extremely degrading 
and prejudicial effect of drug use allegations 
upon a criminal defendant's jury image and 
to leave the matter entirely within the "con-
siderable latitude of discretion11 of the 
trial judge when Constituional rights to 
fair trial are at stake, and then to rely 
on civil cases as a prop for that almost 
unfettered discretion, is, defendant respect-
fully submits, misapplication of an otherwise 
valid principle of law from a different area 
to the criminal lav; in an unwarrantedly broad 
fashiion. As such, it is a proper subject for 
rehearing. Cummings v. Nielson, 42 U. 157, 
Jl» — . • in i im , l l mill | « — — — — • • — • ill • • • • • " !> 
129 P . 6 1 9 . 
A matter which materially affects 
this Court's ruling, hence also a proper matte 
on rehearing, idem, is the matter of lack of 
foundation for the officer's testimony. 
The majority opinion does not deal wit Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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this aspect of defendant's prior argument at 
all unless it is implicit in the sentence 
"the trial judge passed upon the qualification 
of the (expert) witness, and the propriety 
of his testimony as was his prerogative •lf 
The point appears to have been overlooked, 
yet defendant previously argued lack of 
foundation and the foundation requirement 
at pages 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 20, 21 and 
22, Brief of Defendant, Case No. 13642, State 
of Utah v. Vera Mason, U.2d , P2d 
(1975). In fact, this point in various aspects 
and implications forms the basic thrust of 
defednatfs Point II in prior argument. On prio; 
submission the State's brief does not controve: 
defendant's lack-6f-foundation argument at 
any point, except to baldly assert that it 
was "not abouse" to let King's testimony in, 
and even if it were, the prejudicial nature, 
if any, went only to the "weight" to be given 
to it by the j ury. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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On the other hand, the better reasoned cases 
are abundantly clear that a foundation must 
be laid or the testimony of a narcotics 
expert is wholly inadmissible. People v. Telio 
supra., and people v. Ortega, 2 Cal.App.3d 
888 at 903, 83 Cal.Reptr. 260 at 271 and 
cases there cited; 52 ALR2d at 848 - 849. 
If, as stated in 52 ALR2d, "the view 
adhered to ... by the weight of authority 
is that ...expert testimony as to the effects 
of the use of drugs, is not considered ad-
missible to impeach the credibility of a 
witness unless followed by testimony tending 
to show that he was under the influence while 
testifying ... .If then here the testimony of 
Officer King was wholly inadmissible. In a 
slightly different form this is the "foundation 
required by Telio: " A foundation must be laid 
... a failure to ob so can ... result in in-
fringement of the right to a fair trial .... 
It was improper for the State's attorney to 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ask (the witness) whether he used narcotics 
without being able to prove that he was an 
addict or a user of drugs. The ttial judge 
erred in allowing (that information) to the 
jury." JUL, 275 NE2d 222 at 225. 
Officer King's expert testimony as 
to the effects of narcotics on hypthetical 
average persons, addicted and unaddicted, 
let it be said again was never related in 
any meaningful way to the defendant/witness 
as an individual. As the prior dissent has 
noted his testimony did not "tend to show 
guilt or innocence of the defendant, nor did 
it tend to contradict her testimony ...(hence 
it was) testimony ... unsupported by a proper 
foundation and ... immaterial and ... prejudi-
cial. " 
If there was any "peg" for this 
testimony to hang upon, any foundation such 
as the cases require to meet the Constitutional 
standard for fair trial, it must be found in 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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defendant's own admission that she had used 
narcotics that morning. This, however, is 
material elicited for another purpose, A 
purpose which this court has held a.permis-
sible one, i.e. to shed light on her credi-
bility for the jury. It was obtained over 
defense counsels strenuous objection. 
It can hardly be the holding of this court 
thata defendant, immune from the stand by 
constitutional privilege, may be questioned 
for a permissible purpose, then have her in-
court admission, elicited over her counsel's 
objections thereafter available to the State 
for a different purpose, to provide a foun-
dation, the platform from which the State's 
expert discredits her by vague free-floating 
generalizations about narcotics effects. 
Just as admissions of a defendant 
cannot be used to supply deficiencies in the 
state's alleged corpus delicti, thereby re-
lieving the State of even the necessity of 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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so, by analogy, it is unthinkable that 
defendant's judicial admission unwillingly 
extracted can thereafter be the basis upon 
which inspecific, nebulous testimony of 
drug effects is grounded and brought in 
aginst defendant and over her counsels 
repeated objection to provide not help for 
the jury but fodder for speulation and coal 
to the fire of prejudice against defendant 
already kindled by her reluctant admission of 
heroin use. 
Nothing was ever proved about the 
extent, if any, of defendant's "habit11. 
Nothing about the type of drugs used. Nothing 
about the strength. Never did the State adduce 
or even offer a scintilla of independent 
corroborative evidence tending to meet the 
Telio requirement that the state's foundation 
must consist at least of "being able to prove 
(the witness) an addict or a user of drugs." 
Rudimentary ideas of fair play must require Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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the State to prove this minimum before 
bringing in an expert to discredit defendant, 
especially where as in this case defendant 
(had she known what was in store) could 
have stayed completely off the stand as a 
matter of right, and thus robbed the §tate 
of its gratuitous "foundation" and avoided 
the subject of narcotics use altogether and 
hence the prejudice that undoubtedly arose 
from it in the jury's minds. 
To rule otherwise is to permit the 
prosecution to impermissibly bootstrap itself 
up to and past the legal requirement of a 
"foundation" it was unprepared and quite un-
able to have presented on its own. 
The State had already played its 
narcotics-user card to trump the earlier 
trick of the credibility inquiry. 
Came time to play its Ace of Trumps 
(the state narcotics expert) the State Attrone) 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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would have overtrumped the by now helpless 
defendant with his Ace, but had only this one 
card left and by the better considered eases 
and fair-play without the requisite foundation 
lead card he needed to get back into his 
hand* 
It is prejudicial enough to the 
defendant to have before the jury her recent 
use of narcotics without allowing the prose-
cution to manufacture out of that one admission 
as well the foundation it could never supply 
on its own for the coup de grace of damning 
(albeit vague and speculative) expert testi-
mony* 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant was prejudiced in two ways 
by the admission of Officer King's testimony 
as to narcotics effects* First, the evidence 
he gave was In general terms, about average or Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Libr ry, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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hypothetical people and was never related 
to her condidtion on the day of tiral or 
otherwise and hence had no probative effect 
as to her guilt or innocence or as to her 
credibility, the purpose for which it was 
ostensibly admitted. It therefore served 
only to inflame and prejudice the jury against 
her. Secondly, the testimony of Officer King 
was wholly inadmissible even though it might 
have had some evidentiary or advisory value 
to the jury, since without foundation as 
required to meet the standards of fair trial 
and since it depended for its introduction 
solely upon an in-court admission of defendant 
which she could have avoided making as a 
matter of right by staying off the stand, and 
was not grounded on any other corroborative 
or independent foundational proffer by the the 
State. 
The Court is respectfully urged to 
dismiss the verdict against Appellant as 
having been improperly rendered as a matter of 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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law and is requested to vacate the sentences 
imposed on defendant pursuant thereto* 
Respectfully submitted, 
GALEN ROSS, ESQ. 
Attorney for Defendant/ 
Appellant 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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